While Petitioner asserted that these are“just a small part of…defamation, abuse and [Petitioner’s] personal information,” See the Petition,§ Evidence, Appendix 7, he could not even prove these“small part” were actually made by Respo. Id.
2 Note, iitioioner provided o sets of“Appendix” as supp evidence, including Appendix 8 as alleged to be Petitioner’s medical diagnosis.
C. Accusations iitio Supported by Evidence
For instance, in one of the exhibits provided by Petitioner’s sel on May 31, 2023 as evidence supp the Petitioner, which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, Petitioner presented a few online posts made by Respo and accused Respo of“encing people to engage in new i violend doxing against Kang Dai”, and that she“enced people to abuse [Petitioner ]Kang, expose his privacy, and further defame him.”
However, the main tent of these posts was Respo’s questioning why Petitioarted the legal a against her, as she voluntarily removed his name and identity in her posted story and tried to protect Petitioner’s privacy. In these posts, Respo was also made it clear that it was the i users, instead of her, who exposed Petitioner’s information. Most importantly, even in this post, Respo did not mention any name or provide aioner’s personal information.
How could the tent of this post provide any support to Petitioner’s allegation that, by making this post, Respo“enced” people to eer violence against Petitioner, and“enced” people to abuse [Petitioner] Kang, expose his privacy, and further defame him”?
A similar example is Petitioner’s accusation that“Respo’s social media, live streaming Mr. Dai’s private voice record to public without authorization,” attached hereto as Exhibit D. The supp evidence provided was a sshot of pears to be Respo’s social media at, showing a“forecast of live streaming” on May 18, 2023 at 20:00. However, the evidence could not prove any tent of the live streaming, nor could it prove that if the alleged“live streaming” ever took place.
D. Respo Directed No Violence or Threat of Viole Petitioner, and No Unlawful Harassment Be Found under RCW 7.105.100(36)(b).
The Petition was filed with no specific allegation of any violence or threat of violence as defined in RCW 7.105.100(36)(b), nor any evideo prove such violence or threat of violence. Petitioner also made no accusation and provided no evidence for any hate crime, or similar behaviors described in RCW 9A.36.080(1)(c), made by Respo.
Respo’s declaratioablishes that no unlawful harassment be found
under RCW 7.105.100(36)(b).
E. None of Respo’s Behaviors stitute“Unlawful Harassment” under RCW 7.105.100(36)(a).
1. Respo’s online posting of the story involviioner is not a“course of duct” directed at Petitioner.
The love story posted by Respo online tains no names and no identifier information. The posting is nothing more than a brokeed woman’s sharing release emotion and also seekiional support from the members of her unity. The story was about Petitioner (with his name and identifier information hidden iionally by Respo) but was not directed at Petitioner.
Moreover, Respo posted her love story only on April 23, 2023. The later spreading of the story, including those re-posting of the story on other websites, had nothing to do with her and was made by without her knowledge by unknown i users. Petitioner clearly khis fact. Regardless of the tent of Respo’s post, her oime posting of the story would not stitute a“patten of behavior”, and therefore ot establish any“course of duct” for finding unlawful harassment. See RCW 7.105.101(6)(a).
Further, Respo’s refusal of disclosiioner’s name and other personal information again shows that the posting was not“desigo alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner.” See RCW 7.105.101(6)(b).
Lastly, Respo has the freedom to make a spee a publi about her own experiences and feelings. The posted story, and her expression of her feelings in her ents and unication with entators oory, are all stitutionally protected speech, which is clearly carved out from the definition of“course of duct” for finding unlawful harassment. See RCW 7.105.101(6)(a).
2. Respo’s attempts to tact Petitioner were invited by Petitioner and fitimate or lawful purposes.
During the period from May 10, 2023 to May 18, 2023, Respo made in total about 30 calls (she celled another 12 calls), sent in total about 90 (plus 13 sshots) messages, and 7 emails to Petitioner, for the same purpose: prompting respohat romised by Petitioner, and demanding for pensation and resolutions.
Although Respo appeared to be only party initiating these tacts during this period, the unication is essentially a two-way unication because Petitioner, on April 24, 2023, assured Respohat he would“tinually apologize…listen to her demands” and invited Respoo request“anything else” other than apology. And the only reason why Respo tinued her attempts for a week is that Petitioner chose to keep silent– he had never given any clear notice to Respo if he wahe further tact, but simply let Respo tinue her tag attempt. For the same reason, Respo’s attempted tacts were not“desigo alarm, annoy, or harass” Petitioner. See RCW 7.105.101(6)(b). Instead, they were invited, and then prompted, by Petitioner’s promise and silence.
Pursuant to RCW 7.105.010(6)(b), it is evident that Respo’s attempted tact to Petitioner were made fitimate or lawful purposes, and therefore will not stitute a for unlawful harassment.
3. Respo’s attempts to report Petitioo his employer and his supervisors at work are fitimate or lawful purposes.
Respo’s rep to Petitioner’s supervisors at Amazon by email about Petitioner’s misbehaviors, including unig her plaint to two individual supervisors of Petitioner, were made with her belief that she o prompt a third-party authority to iigate the issue and reveal the truth. Moreover, being threatened and insulted by not only Petitioner but also anonymous oackers, res to a third party with authority over Petitioner was Respo’s defense and self-prote. Again, the rep was not“desigo alarm, annoy, or harass” Petitioner, but was made by Respoo seek truth, justice, and protect herself. The rep was also reasonable giveioner had taken Respoo his office for intimate activities and likely violated his employment policies.
The rea of Petitioner’s employer and supervisor supports this clusion. Instead of dismissing Respo’s rep email as any“harassment”, Amazon Inc. quickly opened an iigation and invited Respoo an iigatioing. None of the supervisors that Respo tacted refused the request or in any way indicated that they were harassed, instead, they voluntarily stayed in e with Respo and even replied to Respo directly.
Lastly, Petitioner was aware of Respo’s rep. But he gave no notice to Respo about if he wanted further tacts like this.
4. Respo’s visit to Petitioner’s neighborhood was not a course of dud was not desigo harass Petitioner.
To say farewell to her plicated and bitter relationship with Petitioner, Respo visited the neighborhood where Petitioner may be currently residing on May 1, 2023. Respo stayed in this neighborhood for about 10 minutes and posted two pictures of the neighbor that did not include Petitioner’s property. Her location of the picture showed a medical institute that was about 3200 feet away from the neighborhood.
In this oime visit, Respo had no idea of the exact location or address or Petitioner’s home and did nothing other than walking in the neighborhood and taking some pictures. She did not even know if eveioner was not in the Uates when she paid the visit.
Clearly, Respo’s visit to the neighborhood is not a course of duct directed at Petitioner, not even about Petitioner. At most, it was her way of saying goodbye for herself and the visit was not desigo create any intimating living enviro for Petitioner. By all means, a oime visit to Petitioner’s neighborhood ot be a“pattern of” behaviors, nor was it desigo“alarm, annoy, or harass” Petitioner.
This visit would not support for the finding of unlawful harassment.
5. There is no evideo prove that Petitioner has suffered actual and substantial emotional distress due to Respo’s behaviors.
Petitioner’s evidence ot establish that he has suffered actual substantial emotional distress caused by Respo. The evidence provided by Petitioner shows no name of doctor or the medical institution, nor the date of the diagnosis. The evidence also showed no causal relationship between the diagnosed symptoms and the alleged unlawful harassment. See the Petition,§ Evidence, Appendix 8.
F. No Evidence Is Provided to Establish that Respo Was Stalking or Cyberstalkiioner.
Petitioner is not petitioning for a stalking prote order but checked the box“stalking” in his anti-harassment order petition. This appears to be a sloppy and unintended act as the Petition tains no specific allegatio alone any evidence, regarding Respo’s stalking or cyberstalking.
Moreover, the online exposure of Petitioner’s personal information, including the photos of Petitioner’s child a, has nothing to do with Respo. The reasons causing the exposure are two-folded. On the one hand, Petitioner had voluntarily released and disclosed a substantial amount of personal information including his child’s photos on his social media ats, and invited or enced public members’ attention and following, making him a semi-public figure ier domain. Oher hand, without any knowledge of Respo, anonymous i users had further circulated and spread Petitioner’s already-public personal information.
On the very trary, Respo had explicitly and clearly rejected the idea of exposiioner’s name and personal information. Clearly, she has had no iion to annoy, threaten, or otherwise harass Petitioner.
G. After Being Served of the Temporary Prote Order, Respo Has Never Knowingly or Willfully Violated the Order.
Pursuant to RCW 7.105.455, enfort aies for violation of an antiharassment order could only be imposed if the“respo knows of the order” and“willfully disobey” the order. In addition, the May 16, 2023 temporary prote order required personal service of“a service packet, including a copy of this order, the petition, and any supp materials filed with the petition,” and did not allow alternative service. See Temporary Prote Order dated May 16, 2023,§11, at 8-9.
In this case, the police did not serve the packet on Respo in person. Instead, the temporary order, the petition, and the supp materials were served to Respo email by a police offiay 18, 2023 at 2:02 p.m. The officer received a firmation of receipt at 5:09 on the same day. See Affidavit Declaration or Return of Service Law Enfort Agency (“Proof of Service”) filed on May 30, 2023, p. 1.
Here, after the temporary order was issued on May 16, 2023, all of Respo’s attempts to tact Petitioner were made before she was served of the order and knew of the tent and meaning of the order. Her last attempt to tact Petitioner was made before she actually received the email perf the service of the order.
In additioion also accused Respo of violation of the prote order by“by posting the Order and court dots on her social media”. See Exhibit E attached hereto. But this accusation has no legal basis. In this state,“st. art. 1,§5 guarantees an absolute right to publish and broadcast accurate, lawfully obtained information that is a matter of public record by virtue of having been admitted into evidend presented in open court.” Catlett v. Teel, 15 Wash. App. 2d 689, at 701 (2020). Therefore, the posting of either the entire or a portion of the temporary prote order is within Respo’s stitutional right and will not violate the temporary prote order.
Moreover, making a ent oemporary order, or Petitioner’s petition for such order, is within Respo’s stitutional right and should not be sidered as violation of the order.
Therefore, Respo had never willfully disobeyed the order. On the trary, she voluntarily submitted herself to the poliay 19, 2023 for the exact reason to ensure her full pliah the temporary order, which was firmed by the police.
H. There is o Issue a Full Order Restraining Respo
In posting her May 1, 2023 post titled“Move on”, Respo had already made her mind to end her relationship with Petitioner and, in late April, she had clearly informed Petitiohat she wao stay away from Petitioner.
But this does not mean that Respo is led to damages and bringing legal as to recover such damages. Now, Respo has retained sel and knows her rights and the appropriate and effective way to assert her claims. She has no iion to make any further tact Petitioner and would only want to avoid Petitioner in her life forever.
Therefore, there is no need for a full prote order restraining Respo from doing something that she would never do iure.
I. There is No Basis to Award Attorney’s Fees and Costs to Petitioner.
Petitioner provided no basis whatsoever for this Court to award his attorney’s fees and costs. In this particular case, such relief is inappropriate and unjust. Here, Petitioner’s petition was groundless and unnecessary: he learned from the police, as early as of May 1, 2023, that Respo’s posts did not stitute a threat or harassment.
In additioioner could have informed Respohat he did not want to be tacted, but never did so. Lastly, Petitioner omitted the evidence disfav his position, e.g., the May 1, 2023 police report, to mislead the Court to issue the temporary prote order and forced Respoo incur fees and costs for her defense in this case.
Respo is entitled to attorney’s fees and cost for defending herself against the
Petition, which is without factual and legal basis.
J. Designation of the Parties Should Be Realigned
RCW 7.105.210 provides that,“the court may realign the designation of the parties…where the court finds that the inal petitioner is the abuser or harasser, and the inal respo is the victim of domestic violence or unlawful harassment.
The court may issue a temporary prote order in accordah this chapter until the victim is able to prepare a petition for a prote order in accordah this chapter.”
Here, ample evidence has been provided to show that Mr. Kang Dai, the inal Petitioner here, is the abuser or harasser and that Respo is the actual victim of domestic violence or unlawful harassment. Respo has been subject to unlawful harassment, or domestic violence, or both, that are itted by Mr. Kang Dai and needs a prote order to retrain Mr. Kang Dai from the following behaviors:
? Harm, or threat to harm Respo
? tact or stay within 1,000 feet to Respo and her school, residence, and workplaces
? Stalk or cyberstalk Respo
? Possessing or releasing intimate photos of Respo
? Starting or tinuing abusive litigation against Respo
Accly, we therefore respectfully request that this Court issue a temporary prote ainst Mr. Kang Dai for fourteen days to allow Respoo prepare and file her petition for a prote order.
IV. CLUSION
The petition here is driven by Petitioner’s agenda that has nothing to do with harassment: he wants to deter Respo from pursuing her potential claims against him, to chill Respo and anyone else who dare to show their support and sympathy, and to exhaust the financial resources of Respo, who is an iional student having no indepe ine source.
For the foing reasons, Petitioner Kang Dai’s petition should be dismissed at prejudice with all reliefs requested therein be denied, and the temporary civil prote ainst Respo, entered by this Court on May 16, 2023 and reissued on June 27, 2023 should be vacated. Respo should also be awarded reasoorney’s fees and costs.